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QINCE the 1930's the federal government, through its credit policies,
has played a key role in the construction of housing. Whatever the
effects on the industry, itself, the encouragement the Government has
given to the production of homes in suburban areas has not been viewed
as an unadulterated good. As one student of the subject has noted: "Gov-
ernment inducements to purchase in the suburbs have facilitated a re-
markable increase in homeownership since the war but have endangered
the future existence of the American city."'
Perhaps realizing that a program aimed at having apartment dwellers
move into homes could have as a consequence a city of the future con-
taining square miles of rotting structures (the remains of former thriving
middle-class neighborhoods),2 and, at the same time, faced with the
political impossibility of retracting the benefits accorded to homeowners,
the Eighty-Seventh Congress did the next best thing. It attempted to
rectify the imbalance in federal solicitude by bringing the home to the
apartment dweller,3 thereby allowing him equal access to the Govern-
ment's beneficence. To accomplish this, Congress, although with grave
doubts as to the present legality of the form of ownership,4 extended
mortgage insurance to the apartment owner in the condominium on the
same terms as are available to the purchaser of a single-family home.*
' The author wishes to acknowledge the helpful suggestions of Alan Ivor Hyman, Esq.
in the preparation of this article.
1. Haar, Federal Credit and Private Housing 209 (1960); zee also Whyte, Are Cities
Un-American?, in The Exploding Metropolis 1, 30-31 (195S).
2. See Vernon, The Economics and Finances of the Large Metropolis, in The Future
Metropolis SS-63 (Rodwin ed. 1961).
3. If one's sense of order revolts at the thought of homes moving into apartments it
should be noted that owners of mobile homes are seeking the dezignation "horizontal
apartments."
4. Senator Sparkman: "Are you not putting the cart before the horse to pass Federal
legislation before State legislation is passed?" Mr. Whatley: "Sir, has not that bcen the
custom in most of the innovations and progressive moves ... in the last 15 or 20 years?"
Senator Sparkman: "Of course, if we passed this amendment authorizing FHA to do
this, FHA would be powerless to act until the States passed legislation." Hearings on Housing
Legislation of 1960 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 593-94 (1960).
5. Housing Act of 1961 § 234, 75 Stat. 160, 12 U.S.C. § 1715y (Supp. II, 1959-1961).
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The most striking feature of the condominium as a legal entity, besides
its exotic name, is that the unit owner not only has an apartment in fee
simple, but also that he and the remaining unit owners jointly own and
administer the common areas of the building. Unlike the housing co-
operative familiar in this country, there is neither a shareholder-corpora-
tion nor a tenant-landlord relationship standing between the head of the
household and his home. Like the owner of a home in a suburban sub-
division, he has full title to his home, is solely responsible for its financ-
ing and is separately taxed. In effect, we have a "horizontal fee in a
vertical subdivision."
The first question which this setup presents is whether it is compatible
with present state law, in its common-law and statutory aspects, or what,
if any, legislation will be either necessary or advisable.
The second problem encountered is the effect of the condominium on
the housing industry. More specifically, will the condominium, backed
as it now is by federal mortgage insurance or in the future as part of a
state program, spur construction of housing within the means of median-
income families?
II. STATE LAW ASPECTS
A. Horizontal Fee
The possibility of a fee simple in an apartment or of a horizontal fee
unconnected with the earth was at one time viewed as heretical.0 Today,
with the triumph of rationalism and sociological jurisprudence, it is
merely viewed, by some, as impossible. 7
Yet, despite these learned comments and the ancient Latin maxim,
superficies solo cedit,8 outright ownership of apartments has a hoary
lineage in the common law,' tracing its ancestry figuratively and literally
at least as far back as the Inns of Court.10 The Temple societies, facing
at the end of the sixteenth century a severe shortage of space caused by
the increasing number of admissions and by their own inability to finance
6. Challis, Law of Real Property 54 (3d ed. Sweet 1911).
7. Isaacs, "To Buy or Not to Buy: That is the Question" . . . What is a Cooperative
Apartment?, 13 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 203 (1958).
8. All that is on the soil goes with the soil.
9. For developments under the civil law see Leyser, The Ownership of Flats--A Com-
parative Study, 7 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 31 (1958). For developments under the common law
see generally Ball, Division Into Horizontal Strata of the Landspace Above the Surface,
39 Yale L.J. 616 (1930).
10. The possibility of a freehold in a chamber is discussed in the yearbooks without any
definite conclusion being reached. See Y.B. Mich. 5 H. 7, f. 9 pl. 20 (1490). See also
Brooke, LaGraunde Abridgement, tit. Demaunde f. 213, pl. 20 (1586).
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new construction, allowed individual members to build new chambers
over existing buildings. For their efforts, the individuals were given life
interests with a right of assignment to any of the other members of the
Inn on the same terms." The legal profession being convinced of the
utility and importance of allowing this type of ownership, its acceptance
by the judiciary was not long after. Thus, as early as 1633, in a case of
breaking and entering the reporter said: "And, first, it was resolved, that
a chamber of any inns of Court or Chancery broken open may be domilzs
mansionalis of him who is owner of the said chamber .... "'- Similarly,
Lord Coke tells us: "A man may have an inheritance in an upper
chamber, though the lower buildings and soile be in another, and seeing
it is an inheritance corporeall it shall passe by livery.""la
The possibility of two or more distinct freeholds in a building also was
recognized in some of the earliest cases in the United States. In 1808,
a iMassachusetts court stated: "[I]n legal contemplation, each of the
parties has a distinct dwelling-house. . . 2 1 Thus the defendant is seised
in fee simple of a room on the lower floor and the plaintiff is seised in fee
of a chamber over it.
The key problem remaining is whether space can be owned or con-
veyed-whether the rights of ownership extend to the space enclosed by
the walls of the building or are limited to the materials defining the
walls, with the use of the space being a result of an easement.la This is
a question of more than academic interest to the conveyancer, title
insurer and above all, to the owners, occupants and mortgagees, if the
building, itself, were destroyed.'0
The old common-law maxim, cujzus est solum, ejus et usqzue ad cochtm'-
would seem to answer the question in the affirmative. However, the
advent of the flying machine made it painfully obvious that this doctrine
would have to be qualified to a great extent. As acute a legal mind as
Lord Ellenborough realized that the consequence of such a doctrine
11. See Williamson, The History of the Temple London 227-23 (1924).
12. Evans and Finch's Case, Cro. Car. 474, 79 Eng. Rep. lCG9, 1010 (K.B. 1633).
13. 1 Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England § 59(1)(b)
(13th ed. 1812). In England, horizontal ownership in buildings is now recognizcd by
statute. Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 Geo. 5, c. 20, § 205(ix), at 717.
14. Loring v. Bacon, 4 Mass. 574, 575 (IS03); see also Graves %. Berdan, 26 N.Y. 498
(1S63).
15. Compare P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 1291a (Supp. 195S), with Hawaiian Act No.
1SO, § 2(a) (1961).
16. See generally Ball, The Vertical Extent of Ownership in Land, 76 U. Pa. L. Rev. 631
(1928); Bell, Air Rights, 23 Tn. L. Rev. 250 (1923); Note, 1960 U. Ill. L.F. 303.
17. The owner of the soil owns the space above to the heavens.
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would be "that an aeronaut [would be] . . . liable to an action of tres-
pass . . . at the suit of the occupier of every field over which his balloon
passes .... "
The Supreme Court, in 1938, rejected such a literal interpretation,
but explicitly recognized that "the land owner owns at least as much of
the space above the ground as he can occupy or use in connection with
the land."'" The relevance of the decision is made even clearer by Mr.
Justice Black who in dissenting found that
no rigid constitutional rule . . . commands that the air must be considered as marked
off into separate compartments by imaginary metes and bounds in order to syn-
chronize air ownership with land ownership.20
In a large number of states, the adoption of the Uniform Aeronautics Act
has brought in its wake the recognition that the space above land can be
owned, subject only to the right of flight 21 New Jersey22 and Colorado23
specifically authorize creation of estates in air space whether or not con-
nected or owned by the surface owner.24
Analogous cases are found in other branches of the law. Where a
telephone wire was strung in the space above plaintiff's land, courts have
allowed actions in ejectment on the rationale that "land includes not only
the surface but also the space above and the part beneath. 25 Extending
a hand into another's air space has been held to be a trespass,2 while a
Massachusetts court, in 1872, stated, "projecting . . . eaves over the
plaintiff's land . . . if continued for twenty years, might give . . . a
title to the land by adverse occupation. 27
That the space can be owned independently from the surface can be
18. Pickering v. Rudd, 4 Camp. 219, 220-21, 171 Eng. Rep. 70, 71 (1815).
19. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946).
20. Id. at 271.
21. Uniform Aeronautics Law §§ 3-4 (1938) which has been adopted in Arizona,
Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont and Wisconsin.
22. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 46:3-19 (1940); 52 Harv. L. Rev. 335 (1938).
23. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 118-12-1 (1953); Comment, 25 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 354
(1953).
24. Cal. Civ. Code § 659 which provides that "land is the solid material of the earth . .
would seem to point in the opposite direction. However, it was held in Hinman v. Padfic
Air Transp., 84 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 654 (1937) that there was
"nothing therein to negative the ad coelum formula." 84 F.2d at 757.
25. Butler v. Frontier Tel. Co., 186 N.Y. 486, 491, 79 N.E. 716, 718 (1906).
26. Hannabalson v. Sessions, 116 Iowa 457, 90 N.W. 93 (1902).
27. Smith v. Smith, 110 Mass. 302, 304 (1872).
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adduced from cases in which it has been held that the space formerly
occupied by mined minerals still belongs to the mine owner and not to
the surface owner.' Similarly, in a different sphere a Washington court
has upheld a municipal ordinance granting all space above a given height
over a municipal alley to adjoining landowners?2
In Pearson v. Matheson,30 perhaps the only case directly in point, an
"air lot" was conveyed before the building was erected, and a dispute
arose after the building had been destroyed by fire. The court not only
held the conveyance proper, but expressly recognized that the upper
owner "was sovereign of the air over the . . .store which lay above the
fourteen-foot line" 31 and that title would survive destruction of the
original building.32
As a theoretical matter, a fee which is not necessarily connected with
the ground raises no difficulties. "[A] fee simple absolute is a sector of
space in time and no more tangible than a song or a patent."-' Thus,
there seems to be no good reason for not allowing ownership of space to
a reasonable height above the land. Such space does have economic
value, and as a practical matter, can be sliced into horizontal segments.34
It would seem the least the law should do is "keep pace with the habits
and usages of practical life.1 35
B. Restraints on Alienation
1. Covenant to Bar Partition
The division of buildings into a series of apartments owned in fee
simple is rapidly gaining favor in England." It is usually employed in
two and three-family houses, however, and where a large structure is
23. See, e.g., Lillibridge v. Lackawanna Coal Co., 143 Pa. 293, 22 At. 1035 (1S91);
Mlassot v. Moses, 3 S.C. 168 (1371).
29. Taft v. Washington Mlut. Say. Bank, 127 Wash. 503, 221 Pac. 604 (1923).
30. 102 S.C. 377, 86 SXE. 1063 (1915). Cf. weaver v. Osborne, 154 Iora 10, 134 N.W.
103 (1912).
31. 102 S.C. at 385, S6 S.E. at 1065.
32. See Note, The Airspace as Corporeal Realty, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 525 (1916); Ball, supra
note 16.
33. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 Rutgers L. Rev. 357, 361 (1954).
34. See note 69 infra and accompanying text. But see Cleveland v. City of Detroit,
322 lich. 172, 33 N.WT.2d 747 (1943) where the court rejected plaintiff's argument that a
taking for a public use was vertically excessive on the ground that it had not bven demon-
strated that real estate can he sliced horizontally and vertically into Eegments. For critical
comment of this decision see 24 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 443 (1949).
35. Mlassot v. Moses, 3 S.C. 168, 196 (1371).




involved resort is made to a trust arrangement, a private act of Parlia-
ment,3 7 or incorporation. s In Scotland, where flat ownership is common
even in large projects, a good deal of trouble has arisen. Since each
proprietor owns the walls bounding his apartment, with the upper and
lower occupants owning the roof and ground respectively a cumbersome
system of cross easements has resulted; further, expenses such as roof
repairs have often been inequitably apportioned, and unified control of
the building often sacrificed. 9
Coupling the ownership of the apartment with the joint ownership of
all the common areas eliminates the need for various easements, since
the occupant of an apartment (who is also a tenant in common) can make
full use of the common facilities. Unified control is possible with an
equitable sharing of expenses and some assurance that a uniform state of
repair and maintenance will be found throughout the building. The use
of the tenancy in common, however, requires some safeguard to bar an
individual member from toppling the whole legal structure by seeking
partition during the life of the enterprise. An agreement among co-owners
not to partition will usually be honored by the courts. But although in
form such an agreement does not bar an owner from conveying, the fact
that the usual buyer will want to own severally substantially restricts
marketability,40 and courts have consistently held that such agreements
must be limited in duration.4 In Roberts v. Jones,42 the time limit of the
Rule Against Perpetuities was invoked to test for validity, and an agree-
ment purporting to bind successive purchasers was held invalid.
Although at first glance this seems to require some time limitation on
any restriction to be placed on the right to partition, upon closer examina-
tion this conclusion becomes somewhat dubious. A scheme involving a
building, unlike land, has an inherent limitation on its length. As a
New York court has recently stated:
The fear expressed that the covenant imposes an undue restriction on alienation or
37. Tolson, "Land" Without Earth: Freehold Flats in English Law, 14 Convey. (n.s.)
350,353 (1950).
38. George, Sale of Flats, ch. 5 (2d ed. 1959). It might also be noted that the tenancy
in common has been ruled out by the Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 Geo. 5, c. 20, §§ 1-209,
at 563-722.
39. See Dickson, Freehold Title to Flats?, 28 L. Inst. J. 133 (1954).
40. See Schnelby, Restraints Upon the Alienation of Legal Interests: III, 44 Yale L.J.
1380, 1398 (1935).
41. See 6 American Law of Property § 26.74 (Casner ed. 1952) ; Annot., 132 A.L.R. 666
(1941).
42. 307 Mass. 504, 30 N.E.2d 392 (1940).
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an onerous burden in perpetuity is dispelled by the fact that by its terms it may
run with the land only as long as both buildings are standing and in use.Y3
There is also the clear distinction between the classical buyer of land and
the purchaser of an apartment in a condominium as far as the substance
of the restraint is concerned. As in the case of covenants restricting
the use of property in a residential subdivision (which may be said to
make the land less marketable), the actual effect of the covenants, if
widespread, will be to increase marketability because of the assurance
of stability afforded the potential homeowner. Finally, there is the
reasonableness of the restraint when viewed in the perspective of the
results of a partition decree. The consequence of equity granting a decree
would be the destruction of a cooperative scheme of home ownership
involving scores of families. Over a hundred years ago, an interesting
case-' arose, the resolution of which, with but slight alterations, could be
invoked a hundred years hence in a suit to partition a condominium.
In 1787, various owners of iron furnaces and forges, who also jointly
owned three contiguous hills which contained the iron ore that supplied
their operations, covenanted that these hills shall "remain 'together and
undivided, as a tenancy in common . . . in order to remove all diffi-
culties.' ,4 As explained by the court, the difficulties involved the
necessity of each owner having a local source of raw materials and
the inability to make an equal partition due to the irregular pattern of
the seams of ore and the difference in their quality and quantity. Sixty-
seven years later, a suit for partition was brought, and denied. The court
said:
We have seen what the difficulties in the way of parting this estate into severalty
were, and that they were inherent and enduring. So long as the ore [building] should
last the estate would be incapable of equal partition; and yet so long as these furnaces
and forges [apartments] should continue to manufacture iron [house families], that
ore [building] would be wanted. They used words to obviate the difficulty. The
remedy was commensurate with the evil. Experience had proved it losible for these
tenants in common to supply the wants of their respective establishments ... [and]
that this was the nearest to a partition in severalty to which these hills [building]
could be brought, without "the greatest injustice to some of the parties." Just in
that condition, therefore, shall the mine-hills [building] be left. . . . How long, it
is asked? I answer, as long as the "difficulties" remain. As long as the ore [building]
endures and continues to be wrought in these furnaces and forges [used to house
families in its apartments]. 46
43. Nicholson v. 3C0 Broadway Realty Corp., 7 N.Yr.2d 240, 246, 164 N.E.2d S32, 835,
196 N.Y.S.2d 945, 950 (1959).
44. Coleman v. Coleman, 19 Pa. 100 (1352).
45. Id. at 104.
46. Id. at 107. See also Appeal of Latshaw, 122 Pa. 142, 15 At. 676 (1M).
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2. Right of First Refusal
To assure the owners of the building some choice as to their future
neighbors, a right of first refusal is granted to the council of owners and
to the individual owners. This pre-emption right, however, lapses within
a short period after the seller produces a prospective buyer. In contra-
distinction to the case of the corporate cooperative, the prime motive
here is not financial protection (since the increase in maintenance charges
in case of default will usually be small), but rather a desire to choose
one's neighbors. Also, unlike the traditional cooperative, the restraint is
placed directly on the fee.
In considering condominium-enabling legislation, the Hawaiian legis-
lature, brought face to face with this prospect, shied away and refused
to include the right of first refusal fearing that it might be struck down
as an invalid restraint.4 7 Whether or not this fear is justified, it assumes
the judiciary will espouse a position that not only overlooks the distinc-
tion between an option agreement and a pre-emption agreement,4 but
also turns a rule based on a social policy of increasing marketability of
land into an immutable law. If the pre-emptor must pay the offeror's
price (as opposed to a price fixed when the agreement was made, and
now possibly so low as to restrict a sale), there is no material impedi-
ment to alienation.
In general, courts have upheld restrictions on shares of cooperative
housing corporations which were far more severe-the decisions resting
not on the fact that stock rather than a fee was involved, but rather on
a conscious weighing of social policies. Thus in a New York case where
sale was forbidden without consent of the board of directors or two-
thirds of the stockholders, the court upheld the restriction saying, "the
residential nature of the enterprise, the privilege of selecting neighbors
and the needs of the community are not to be ignored."40 And, in Gale v.
York Center Community Co-op., Inc., ° where the restraint was directly
on the fee, the court stressed
that the crucial inquiry should be directed at the utility of the restraint as compared
with the injurious consequences that will flow from its enforcement. If accepted social
and economic considerations dictate that a partial restraint is reasonably necessary
for their fulfillment, such a restraint should be sustained. 51
47. Hawaiian Legis. Standing Comm. Rep. No. 846, at 2 (April 26, 1961).
48. See 6 American Law of Property § 26.65 (Casner ed. 1952).
49. Penthouse Properties, Inc. v. 1158 Fifth Ave., Inc., 256 App. Div. 685, 691, 11 N.Y.S.2d
417, 422 (1st Dep't 1939). See generally Note, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1407 (1948).
50. 21 IRI. 2d 86, 171 N.E.2d 30 (1960).
51. Id. at 92, 171 N.E.2d at 33.
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It is also conceivable that a court may follow a primrose path and
test the restriction by applying the Rule Against Perpetuities. Thus, the
duration and not the actual effect of the device would be the controlling
factor. Since the right of first refusal need not vest within the period of
perpetuity, such a right can, and has been, struck down as a violation of
the rule.52 As mentioned earlier, however, the court, to do this with the
condominium, would have to ignore social and economic considerations,
as well as the fact that the life of a building is fairly limited in a period
when our destructive devices have outrun our constructive techniques 3
3. Bar to Severance: Agreement to Convey
A similar problem and analysis would be involved (1) where the
owners agree to bar severance of the unit from the common areas; and
(2) where each owner agrees to convey his property (on a vote of a
designated percentage of the owners) if the building is totally or partially
destroyed. The latter agreement is especially valuable when the interests
of the owners survive the destruction of the building, for in the absence
of such an agreement, a difficult adjustment of rights might well be in
the offing. In this case the application of the rules would cause precisely
that which the rules seem designed to combat. The limitation assures
that the property is kept in the flow of commerce and does not forever
remain as a charred ruin, a monument to one man's obstinacy.
C. Real Covenants
For the condominium to achieve any sort of permanence, provision
must be made that assignees and successors are bound by the original
agreements and any subsequent agreements of which they should have
notice. Thus, agreements as to the means by which owners will exercise
control over the administration of the building and share expenses as to
its maintenance, contracts restricting the use to be made of the individual
fee (generally to residential use and perhaps more specifically, to do
nothing that will increase the fire insurance rates of the building or other-
wise unduly annoy the other occupants) and finally, the previously dis-
cussed agreements barring partition and creating a pre-emption right or
52. Neustadt -. Pearce, 145 Conn. 403, 143 A.2d 437 (1953). See generally Sparls, A
Decade of Transition in Future Interests, 45 Va. L. Rev. 493 (1959); see also 6 American
Law of Property § 26.66 (Casner ed. 1952).
53. A saving clause might be included to allow the court to reform any interet that
would violate the rule. However, there is some doubt as to whether a court would accept
such jurisdiction. Leach & Logan, Perpetuities: A Standard Saving Clause to Avoid
Violations of the Rule, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1141, 1146 (1961).
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requiring a conveyance under certain situations, will have to satisfy the
technical requirements that there be "privity" between the parties and
that the covenants "touch and concern" the property before they will be
held to run with the land.
The agreements among the tenants in common on the care and repair
of the property would raise no problems with regard to privity. 4 Having
the restrictions as to the use and sale of the original conveyances to the
parties would satisfy the privity doctrine 5 in the sense it refers either to
succession to the estate of one of the parties or succession of estate
between the covenantor and covenantees 3 Nevertheless, under the
latter interpretation difficulties may arise in enforcing later alterations
of the agreements. Problems would also exist in Massachusetts, which
posits the need for mutual and simultaneous interests of the parties in
the same land.5 7 However, despite the fact that they do not meet the
technical requirements of privity, these provisions will be enforced as
equitable servitudes,
With respect to the touch and concern requirement, the only difficulty
that could arise would be in a jurisdiction following the so-called English
rule 9 that affirmative burdens will not run with the land even in equity.
Although almost all the states disregard this rule, lip-service is still given
to it in New York.6 ' But it is doubtful that a decision adverse to the
condominium would be rendered even there. Albeit the agreement by a
co-owner to pay his share of the maintenance charges is an affirmative
burden, it would certainly be upheld in light of the Neponsit case,01
which upheld a covenant calling for payments for the upkeep of land
that was not even owned by the covenantor. The agreement to convey
54. See Walsh, Covenants Running with the Land, 21 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 28, 33 (1946).
55. See generally Clark, Real Covenants and Other Interests Which "Run with the Land,"
ch. 4 (2d ed. 1947).
56. Wheeler v. Schad, 7 Nev. 204 (1871).
57. Morse v. Aldrich, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 449 (1837).
58. See Parker v. Nightingale, 88 Mass. (6 Allen) 341 (1863); 2 American Law of
Property § 9.26 nn.2 & 3 (Casner ed. 1952).
59. See London & So.W. Ry. v. Gomm, 20 Ch. D. 562 (CA. 1882). There Is some
question as to whether this is still the rule in England. See Law of Property Act, 1925,
15 Geo. 5, c.20, § 78(1), at 616; Smith v. River Douglas Catchment Ed., [1949] 2 All E.R.
179 (C. A.) ; Leyser, supra note 9.
60. Miller v. Clary, 210 N.Y. 127, 103 N.E. 1114 (1913). See also Guaranty Trust Co.
v. New York & Queens County Ry., 253 N.Y. 190, 170 N.E. 887, appeal denied, 282 U.S. 803
(1930).
61. Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Indus. Say. Bank, 278 N.Y. 248,
15 N.E.2d 793 (1938).
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the fee simple on a vote of a majority of the owners in case of destruction
would, it seems, also bind successors in interest. First, it does not offend
any of the policies which the rule was meant to express, viz., the reluc-
tance of courts to force the holder of encumbered land to dip into his
pocket to satisfy the burden; the hesitancy of courts to supervise specific
performance; 2 the desire to remove the restraint on alienation which
enforcement would effect. Second, the New York courts have come close
to abandoning the rule in recent years. 3 The test applied in determining
when a covenant is personal or real-namely,
a covenant which runs with the land must affect the legal relations-the advantages
and the burdens--of the parties to the covenant, as owners of particular parcels of
land and not merely as members of the community in general0 4
-would put the covenant to convey in the latter real category and, there-
fore, it would be allowed to run with the land.
D. Zoning
Just like any other structure, a condominium building would have to
satisfy the local zoning ordinances. As a multifamily structure it should
and would be treated as any other building in that category. However,
a unique problem might arise in the sale of units in a structure previously
subject to single ownership where the zoning ordinance would require,
as the one upheld in Clemons v. City of Los Angeles,3 that no lot held
under separate ownership at the law's effective date and used for
dwelling purposes shall be reduced in any manner below the minimum
lot area, size or dimension (5,000 square feet). Such an ordinance,
if applied to the sale of units in a condominium, would prohibit the divi-
sion of ownership.6 In Clemons, the law barred a subdivision of
bungalow courts into separate parcels, although no change in use was
effectuated by the sale. An attack on the ordinance's constitutionality,
based on the claim that it had no relation to the public health, safety,
morals or general welfare, was rebuffed. The court, however, rested its
decision quite heavily on the trial court's finding that this was a justified
use of the police power on the basis that such a
subdivision ... tends "to create slum conditions" because it would be unlikely that
a uniform state of repair would be maintained by the various owners and a "hodge-
62. See Note, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 320 (1937).
63. Nricholson v. 303 Broadway Realty Corp., supra note 43. See Iillion, Amandes
Lesar, Martz, Real and Personal Property, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 357 (1961).
64. 278 N.Y. at 257, 15 N.E.2d at 796.
65. 36 Cal. 2d 95, 222 P.2d 439, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 326 (1950).
66. See suggested problem in Haar, Land-Use Planning 223 (1959).
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podge appearance" would result, with a consequent depreciation in value of the
entire property; . . . "and where there is no one to make or enforce any rules
touching items of common necessity" . . . the situation could create disturbingtensions. 67
In a later case, the same ordinance was held to violate the Constitution
when such a justification could not be found.68 The condominium which
makes provisions for unified control and maintenance of the property
should, therefore, be able to survive an onslaught directed merely at the
change in ownership which takes place.
E. Conveyancing and Recording
Moving into the more mechanical realms of real property, the descrip-
tion of the property for conveyancing purposes will have to include a
third dimension-height. Although a bit more complex, it raises no
insuperable problems. In Chicago, during the late twenties, the Marshall
Field building, erected over railroad property, was conveyed so as to
require no easements of support. This was accomplished by platting and
conveying not only the air lots to be occupied by the building, but also
the caisson and prism lots so that Marshall Field would have fee title
even to its supporting columns.69 The deed to a New York City con-
dominium in 1947, accomplished the same result by metes and bounds
conveyancing. 70 Thus, after conveying the entire property to twelve
joint tenants, the deed went on to make the following exception:
All the space or area ... above described which lies between two horizontal planes
the lower of which has an elevation 94.46 feet above datum and the upper of
which has an elevation 105.63 above datum and the vertical limits of which are
bounded . . . (distance from Madison Avenue and East 84th Street respectively).7 1
The federal regulations require that,
the multifamily structure in which the family unit is located shall have been
committed to a plan of apartment-ownership by enabling deed, deed of constitution,
public deed, or other recorded instrument ...binding within the jurisdiction 72
67. 36 Cal. 2d at 100-01, 222 P.2d at 443.
68. Morris v. City of Los Angeles, 116 Cal. App. 2d 856, 254 P.2d 935 (Dist. Ct. App.
1953).
69. See Becker, Subdividing the Air A New Method of Acquiring Air Rights, Extra Vol.
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 40 (1931); Reeves, The Influence of the Metropolis on the Concepts,
Rules and Institutions Relating to Real Property, 177-84 (1948). See also Brennan, Lots of
Air-A Subdivision in the Sky, 12 Lawyers Title News 1 (1957) describing a more recent
deed involving the forty-one story Prudential Building in Chicago.
70. 4520 Conveyances 466 (City Register of New York) (1947). Parts of the deed are
cited and criticized in Ramsey, Condominium: The New Look in Co-ops, 6-7, 25-26 (1961)
(Chicago Title and Trust Co.). See also N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1946, § 8, p. 1, col. 8.
71. 4520 Conveyances 466 (City Register of New York) (1947).
72. 24 C.F.R. § 234.26(b) (1962).
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in order to be eligible for mortgage insurance. In spite of the phrase-
ology, it is likely that this requirement would be satisfied by a uniform
building plan which would include: (1) a description of the land, struc-
ture, apartments and common areas; (2) a clear expression as to the
use for which each of the family units is destined; and (3) the basic
restrictions on the individual unit in the condominium previously dis-
cussed. Such a building plan would be binding on future apartment
dwellers.z3
Once the subdivision plat is recorded, the conveying of an individual
apartment could be fairly simple. To quote a leading title insurer, the
apartment would be described in the conveyance as follows: "The fee
simple title to the parcel of land, property and space designated as
Apartment Parcel 100 in the plat of subdivision [which is] recorded in
the Recorder's Office;"174 whereas the common areas would be described
in the conveyance thus:
The . . . fee simple title to an undivided 6.666 percent interest in the land, prop-
erty and space known as Lot 1 in Block 1 in Jones Subdivision, in Section ...
Township ... excepting from said Lot 1 all the land, property and space designated
as Apartment Parcels 1 to 100, both inclusive in the plat of subdivision recorded... 75
It might be advisable to mention at this juncture that the condo-
minium, which has all the physical manifestations of an apartment house,
is within the scope of subdiision-enabling legislation of many states."0
When conveyancing is done by the plat method, this might seem obvious.
But even a conveyance by metes and bounds might fall within the scope
of such regulation and be viewed as an attempt to evade the statute. It
would hardly behoove a builder or investor to claim he was not sub-
dividing "real property ' 7 or that the condominium did not involve the
"dixsion of a lot, parcel or tract of land . . . for the purpose of sale or
of building development . . .,7 after contending that the space above
land should be treated in the same manner as land. It is quite likely,
however, that no difficulty would arise if the plan for the condominium
were submitted to the local governmental agency in charge of regulation.
73. See Wischmeyer v. Finch, 231 Ind. 282, 107 N.E.2d 661 (1952); Annot., 4 AJ,.R2d
1364 (1949).
74. Ramsey, op. cit. supra note 70, at 29.
75. Id. at 28.
76. The condominium, being subject to laws aimed at developments along the urban-
rural fringe, is analogous to the traditional cooperative in that it is held subject to "blue 0-y"
laws which were not aimed at transactions involving the purchase of a home.
77. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 11535(a).
78. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 236.02(S) (Supp. 1962).
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Omission of this detail, nevertheless, could subject the sponsor to criminal
sanctions 7 9 or else make the conveyance either voidable at the option of
the purchaser,"' or null and void,"' depending upon the jurisdiction.
F. Taxation
A possible difficulty in a number of states is the Federal Housing Ad-
ministration requirement that
real estate taxes must be assessed and be lienable against the individual units, together
with their undivided interests in the common elements, and not against the multi-
family structure, otherwise a tax lien could amount to more than the value of any
particular unit in the structure and thus present a situation which would be unsatis-
factory from the mortgaging standpoint.82
This is basically a statutory matter and even if the taxes on the indi-
vidual apartments were assessed to each owner,8 3 the common areas
would be taxed as a unit in a large number of jurisdictions.8 "
G. Legislation
Although the above detail might have to be ironed out by legislation,
it seems that the condominium could survive an encounter with any judi-
cial authority willing to go beyond hornbook law. However, as a practical
matter, since the federal program (or for that matter, any new innova-
tion in housing) will hinge on its acceptance by the most practical of
men, mortgagees, enabling legislation" would be deemed a judicious
approach.
Such legislation would provide a basic guide to the rights and duties
of the unit owners with respect to their individual apartments.8 The
common areas could be defined and provision made for their adminis-
tration. Thus, the Puerto Rican statute requires that bylaws be recorded
(along with the deed) which make provision for (a) the form of adminis-
79. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40: 55-1.23 (Supp. 1961).
80. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 236.31(3) (1957).
81. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 8-25 (1960).
82. Letter From the Federal Housing Administration to Directors of Field Offices
Oct. 9, 1961.
83. See Cincinnati College v. Yeatman, 30 Ohio St. 276 (1876).
84. See Jarrett v. Osborne, 84 W. Va. 559, 101 S.E. 162 (1919). See also Mass. Gen.
Laws Ann. ch. 59, § 11 (Supp. 1961); McManus v. City of Boston, 320 Mass. 585, 70 N.E.2d
819 (1947).
85. Leyser, The Ownership of Flats-A Comparative Study, 7 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 31
(1958). See also Ark. Stat. Ann. § 50-1001 (Supp. 1961); Hawaiian Act No. 180, § 2(a)
(1961); P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 1292 (Supp. 1958).
86. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 1291p (Supp. 1958).
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tration (specifying the powers of the administrator and the limitations
thereon), (b) the procedure for co-owner meetings, (c) the maintenance
of the property, (d) the proportionate sharing of expenses, (e) the
procedure for amending the bylaws17 and (f) the access which each
owner is to have to the administrative records.,' Attempts to partition
the common areas or sever the unit from the common areas could be
barred for the life of the enterprise; or in lieu of the latter, a provision
that liability for a prorated share of administrative expenses cannot be
avoided by renouncing rights in the common areas. To ease enforcement
of common expenses against a recalcitrant or defaulting owner a statu-
tory lien on his unit would be provided. 9
With respect to improvements, the Puerto Rican law requires a unani-
mous vote for all work affecting the common areas not essential for
maintaining the property.0 Although this protects the individual owner,
it does so at the expense of the majority. It is submitted that the Italian
Civil Code, Article 1120,°1 which allows two-thirds of the owners to make
a binding decision as to an improvement if the improvement is of a value-
raising nature and not too costily, achieves a sounder accommodation of
the respective interests. Article 1121.(3) " of the same statute allows
installation of improvements (which would not otherwise qualify), and
preserves the rights of dissenting co-owners to join at a later time, if
they are willing to bear a proportionate share of the cost.
Common insurance should be allowed without affecting the rights of
the individual unit owner to insure his apartment. The enabling act should
provide for the inclusion in every agreement of a provision outlining the
disposition of the property in the event of partial or total destruction-
the act including in its own procedure a section to cover an agreement
which either fails to make such a provision, or in which a gap is present.
Thus, even as carefully drawn an agreement as the one setting up the
New York condominium93 left a curious lacuna by requiring an affirma-
tive vote of eighty per cent of the owners either to rebuild the property
or to convey it.
In the case of a sale, the managing agency and/or the individual unit
S7. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 1293a (Supp. 1958).
83. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 1293b (Supp. 1958).
S9. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 1293d (Supp 1958).
go. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 1291n (Supp. 1958).
91. Cited in Leyser, supra note 85, at 43.
92. Ibid.
93. A copy of the agreement was made available to the author by Mr. William Kerr,
counsel at the Equitable Life Assurance Society.
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owners should be permitted to exercise a right of first refusal and a right
of redemption 94 if the seller fails to notify the other owners of the sale.
These rights should lapse a reasonable time (thirty days"5) after notice
is given. In a large project, it might also be useful to require that some
order of preference among the owners be established if the bids are
equalY6 To avoid any of the previously discussed problems, the statute
should specifically exempt the agreements herein discussed from the
rules concerning restraints on alienation, and should provide that the
agreements, and any later recorded modifications, be deemed to run
against assignees and successors in interest.
Finally (and perhaps most important in a world where even members
of cooperatives are not necessarily cooperative and problems arise which
were unforeseen even by the acutest legislative mind), easy access
should be provided to the courts (with the managing agency being sub-
ject to process and allowed to conduct litigation) and/or if the parties
agree, to an arbitrator-a speedier, cheaper, and perhaps more appro-
priate recourse for most intramural squabbles.
III. THE EFFECT ON THE HOUSING INDUSTRY
Having arrived at the conclusion that the condominium can be inte-
grated into our legal system, the next query is whether it will be of any
help in alleviating the housing problems of the majority of American
families who have incomes below $6,500.97
Behind the provisions extending mortgage insurance to the condo-
minium on the same basis as single family homes 8 was the belief that
this would provide an incentive for investors to construct apartment
buildings for moderate and lower-income groups.99 The need for new
94. In spite of all the claims, e.g., statement of Dr. Pico, Hearings Before the Subcom-
mittee on Housing of the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess. 249 (1960), the Puerto Rican legislation limits the rights to co-owners of the same
unit. (P.R. Laws Ann. fit. 31, § 1291q (Supp. 1958)), although previous legislation allowed
all the owners to exercise the right. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 1275 (1956).
95. Time provided for in the New York Agreement, note 93 supra.
96. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 1275 (1956).
97. See statement of Mr. Robert Weaver, Administrator of the Housing and Home
Finance Agency, Hearings on the Housing Act of 1961 Before the Subcommittee on Housing
of the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1960).
98. The Commissioner is authorized to insure mortgages of up to 971 (up to $13,500)
of the appraised value of the unit and having a duration of up to thirty years. Housing
Act of 1961 § 234(c), 75 Stat. 160, 12 U.S.C. § 1715y (Supp. 1II, 1959-1961).
99. See statement of Dr. Fern6s-Isern in Hearings on the Housing Legislation of 1960
Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess. 585 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings 1960].
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incentive to builders in this range of the market is quite evident from
looking at the statistics.
The Housing and Home Finance Agency, in its 1960 report, after
recognizing the need for low-cost housing,"'O frankly admitted, "little
of last year's new home production was aimed at rehousing ill-housed
families in the low and lower-middle income brackets."10' The portion of
families not served by the federal program is by no means small. The
median income of urban families in 1960 was $5,623, whereas 44.5 per
cent of all United States families had incomes below $5,000.112 The
average income of the occupant of the average new home covered by
federal mortgage insurance was $7,590.113 In the field of rental housing,
the class benefited is composed of individuals and families with incomes
in the range of $10,000.1o'
Shifting the focus to the amount of activity stimulated and moving
into the area of management cooperatives, in the ten years the section
2 1310a program has been in existence, a grand total of 35,81110 units
have been produced-the 1960 figure being 4,425.117 As a basis of com-
parison, under the New York State program, in December of 1961, an
estimated 50,000 units (almost all in cooperatives) were under construc-
tion or being planned in New York City alone"LS--with an apartment
project covering but one square block, alone containing 1,317 family
units. 00
From this brief survey it would appear that whatever other strong
points the federal housing program may have, stimulation to production
of homes for the median-incomed is not its forte. It would, therefore,
10. Housing and Home Finance Agency, Fourteenth Annual Report 10 (1960).
101. Id. at 10-11.
102. Id. at 325, Table A-23.
103. Id. at 126. The new home was xalued at $14,S99. It would seem that even this
figure is deceptive since a high proportion of the homes were built in warm climates (the
four leading states under the § 203 program were Florida, California, Texas and Arizona),
and therefore did not require heating facilities. This seems to be borne out by the fact
that only one-third of the homes had any sort of basement.
104. Id. at 126. The average rental was $165 a month. The income range figure aszumes
one-fifth of income goes out for rent. Lloyd Rodwin uses one-sLxth as the percentage of
income expended for rent by middle-income families, Housing and Economic Proge.s (1961).
105. 24 C.F.R. pt. 213 (1962).
106. Housing and Home Finance Agency, op. cit. supra note I00, at 81, Table 11I-14.
107. Id. at 7S, Table MI-1l. It should be noted that over half were built in Florida and
none in New York.
10. N.Y. Times, Dee. 10, 1961, § 1, p. 66, cols. 1-2.




seem worthwhile to examine any scheme put forward by Congress that
intends to fill this gap. Hence the question immediately arises as to the
advantages the condominium"' presents over the cooperative housing
program"1 which, itself, has hardly been a booming success.
The prime advantage of the condominium over the traditional coop-
erative is its simplicity. It would seem that cooperative housing has not
been met with a great deal of enthusiasm in most American cities. The
concept of "owning but not owning" has been called a bit too sophisti-
cated a concept for the average person in the market for a home." ' The
close parallel to the subdivision and the absence of a tenant-landlord
relationship might make apartment dwelling a more palatable psychic
experience.
Unlike the traditional cooperative, the unit owner retains his character-
istic independence. His fate does not hinge on his neighbor's solvency
as is the case where there is a single project mortgage. The financial
arrangements he makes are determined solely by his own financial posi-
tion. He can not only set his own down payment, but refinance the
mortgage or prepay it, depending on personal circumstances. In the
usual section 213 cooperative the unit owner is restricted on resale of his
share to losing money or breaking even, since the bylaws usually grant
the corporation an option to purchase the stock at book value. 1 3 The
condominium owner, however, although subject to a right of first refusal,
will receive, even if the right is exercised, the offering price of a willing
buyer.
110. See generally Dr. Fern6s-Isern, Senate Hearings 1960, at 585; Murray, Con-
dominium, House and Home, Dec. 1961, p. 148; Vogel, New Break for Apartment Owners,
Arch. Forum, Sept. 1961, p. 132. Cf. James Schever, Senate Hearings 1960, at 609.
111. See generally Vogel, The Co-op Apartment (1960); Isaacs, supra note 7; Note,
Federal Assistance in Financing Middle-Income Cooperative Apartments, 68 Yale L.J.
542 (1959).
112. It would seem that the condominium because of its origin might be particularly
attractive to Puerto Ricans. It is also claimed colored minorities have shied away from
co-ops. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1961, p. 1, col. 3. Although the complexity of the concept
may be a factor, Louis Winnick, who is Research and Planning Director of the New York
Housing and Redevelopment Board, in an interview with the writer, doubted the accuracy
of the claim and maintained that even if it were true, it would reflect more a reluctance to
pioneer a move into an all-white neighborhood than anything else. Other difficulties are
claimed to face middle-income cooperatives. See "Mid-income families shun subsidized
co-ops in N.Y.," House and Home, Jan. 1962, p. 41. They would seem to rest on the loca-
tion and the project-like appearance of the buildings. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1961, p. 19,
col. 1 (Editorial).
113. See Art. III, § 5 of the recommended bylaws set forth in Appendix D of Vogel,
op. cit. supra note 111, at 109. See also N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1959, § 8, p. 1, col. 8.
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These factors might make the condominium attractive to the two
fastest growing segments of our population-the newly formed family
and retired couples."' To the older couple who might have paid off the
mortgage in a suburban home and now have lost their zest for mowing
their half-acre lawn, the greater security of the condominium might be
particularly appealing.1" While to the younger couple also in the market
for "apartment-type accommodations that are easy to maintain, within
their means and readily accessible to shopping and work centers,1 '1 0 the
low down payment and the possibility of a later sale at the market price
when they outgrow their present quarters might make this form of
ownership inviting.
The condominium also offers advantages where the site has good com-
mercial value. The federal regulations specifically allow part of the
building to be devoted to commercial use, and if this is a part of the
common areas, the expenses of maintaining the building can be defrayed
by the income from the store. In the cooperative housing corporation,
however, if this income exceeds twenty per cent of gross collections, the
individual shareholders lose their right to deduct a proportionate share
of the interest and taxes paid by the corporation. 7 Another attractive
feature is the more equitable allocation of voting control. Unlike the
section 213 cooperative, voting rights in the condominium are allocated
according to the value of the respective interests of the owner.1"
The condominium may be more attractive to lenders, who, in spite of
mortgage insurance and the facility of collection in case of default, have
shied away from traditional cooperatives." 2 The condominium is not
only free from the tinge of socialism that some have claimed has inter-
fered with the financing of housing cooperatives,2 0 but it allows the
lender to choose his risks, while at the same time limiting the size of his
investment in any single project.'-' The lender also is not faced with an
all or nothing situation in the case of foreclosure. 2
114. By 1970, the number in the 20-30 age group wil increase by 395e, the 65 and over
age group will increase by 24%, Housing and Home Finance Agency, op. cit. supra note
1CO, at 14-15. It is estimated that there 'will be forty-three million people in tho:e two
groups.
115. There is also the benign tax treatment that would be accorded such a change in
homes. nt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1034.
116. Housing and Home Finance Agency, Thirteenth Annual Report 16 (1959).
117. InL Rev. Code of 1954, § 216.
11S. 24 C.F.R. § 234.26(b) (6) (1962).
119. See Note, supra note 111, at 569.
120. Id. at 573.
121. United Housing Foundation, Seward Park Cooperative, p. 9 (1961).
122. The Equitable Life Assurance Society which has never financed a § 213 cooperative
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To the builder and investor the advantage posed for the consumer has
the complementary effect of enhancing the marketability of their product.
It further presents, as does the cooperative, the opportunity of involving
but little of his own capital in a highly speculative enterprise,"' and the
possibility, unlike rental property, of not having to manage the property,
which is viewed as, at best, an annoyance.124 Even more important, he
can withdraw his investment as soon as he can sell the individual
units.
These advantages, however, will not cause the housing industry to drop
everything it is doing and rush to build a castle in the air for every
median-income dweller. In an inherently risky business no one wishes to
make it even riskier by trying something new. Thus, all the paeans of
praise by "ivory tower commentators" and witnesses to congressional
committees will not create a market for a new form of ownership in
areas where in the past the cooperatives have not sold, whereas, in areas
such as New York, where cooperatives have been marketed successfully,
and a backlog of experience with them has been built up, there is little
incentive for the realtor to try something new. But this lag in educating
the public is present in any new program and the industry is competitive
enough for us to assume that an alert builder will take a calculated
gamble on it.
There are, however, other countervailing considerations besides inertia.
The advantage of financial independence can be overstated.",, Not only
are there instances in which the cooperative has helped an individual ride
out a financial storm, but the cooperative housing experience over the last
quarter of a century has been excellent, and if cooperative housing had
a hard time in the depression, so did every other enterprise.
The previously discussed advantages to mortgagees have their corre-
sponding disadvantages to mortgagors. Individual mortgages require
more servicing than a single project mortgage."' Individual deeds will
also involve individual closings as well as title insurance-all adding up
to higher interest charges. The banks' ability to choose their risks can
has agreed to finance the purchase of individual units in a twenty story San Juan con-
dominium. Equitable Agency Item, May 1961, p. 7.
123. See generally Winnick, Rental Housing: Opportunities for Private Investment
(1958); Colean, Realities of Today's Real Estate Investment, Arch. Forum, April 1955, p.
125.
124. Interviews With Mr. Erwin S. Wolfson and Mr. M. Rosen of the Kratter Corp.
125. There is one other similarity to homeowning. If you missed payments on the
mortgage, it could be foreclosed. N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1962, p. 27, col. 8.
126. See Note, supra note 111, at 603.
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quite possibly work to the disadvantage of the median-income borrower,
especially if colored. It thus seems that if mortgage money will be avail-
able, it will be at higher interest rates or greater discounts since the Fed-
eral Housing Administration has set a maximum of 514 per cent 27 for
insured mortgages.
The prospect of a multiplicity of mortgagees can also be unnerving to
a developer, since this presents the prospect of having to cope with vary-
ing appraisals of the units he is trying to market. The chance of getting
a number of banks to arrive at the same set of appraisals the Federal
Housing Administration and developer have arrived at, when, for ex-
ample, the opposing virtues of the second and fourteenth floor are in-
volved, or a view of the park is valued against that of factories (or the
city skyline), is quite small. When to these difficulties is added the
general practice of having the efficiency unit partially subsidize the three-
bedroom apartment, the chances of uniform valuations become even
slighter.
Yet these factors are overshadowed by the skyrocketing land and con-
struction costs to which the federal legislation offers no solution. Sub-
urban land is nearly three times as costly today as in 1946.123 Neverthe-
less, this increase has not been at the benefit of city realty. The supply
in large cities of vacant land suitable for residential use has become so
scarce that land costs are astronomically high. Thus, the land acquisition
costs for an unplush public housing project in an unfashionable section
of the Bronx was $4 a square foot' or $SO,000 for the small half-acre
lot with barely enough room for the outdoor barbecue, let alone the
stainless steel swimming pool. Matching this rise has been the rise in
construction costs. Although construction figures are generally deceptive,
it would seem that a 1,000 square foot apartment with its accompanying
common areas cannot be built for less than $16,000, with $20,000 being
a more realistic figure."2 At these costs not only is a delineation of the
127. 24 C.F.R. § 234.29 (1962).
123. Housing and Home Finance Agency, op. cit. supra note lCO, at 1G9.
129. Figure from 1innick, supra note 112.
130. See, e.g., (a) Cost of "unplush apartment project," Winnicl, supra note 112. (bt
At $1.0 a cubic foot development cost for an apartment building (Interview With Mr. D1.
Rosen, supra note 124), it would cost $14,576 to build a 4y, room apartment (gro:z cubic
footage of apartment 10,982). United Housing Foundation, op. cit. supra note 121. This does
not include the cost of common areas. (c) The same apartment with common areas in the
Seward Park Cooperative would have cost $13,153. But note the following: 1. The United
Housing Foundation has the reputation as the most frugal builder in New York. 2. There
was a ten million dollar subsidy in the way of land costs through the ue of the federal
Title 1 program. 3. The construction contracts were signed over live years ago. (d) A
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middle-income group in terms of "the ability to buy newly built space of
some sort out of their private income"' 3 incomprehensible, but a federal
program limited to manipulation of the credit trio which expects to bring
the benefits of new construction within the means of most families, is
illusory.
Returning to the condominium, it would seem that at least for the
present, its use in urban areas will be limited to luxury apartment build-
ings. When the neighboring penthouse has a $100,000 mortgage, it is
comforting to know that even if the owner were to go broke only the
bank is left holding the bag. The condominium might also be advan-
tageously used in the suburban subdivision to allow the developer to take
leave of his project and leave the sidewalks, swimming pool and golf
club to the homeowners without having to resort to a corporation.
If the condominium is to do more than spawn a new upsurge in luxury
accommodations in our cities, it will have to be integrated not only into
the states' legal systems, but more important, into their housing programs.
The success of the condominium as a spur to the construction of new
median-income housing will hinge on how well it can be fitted into such
projects as the one now being carried out in New York.
The Mitchell-Lama Act in New York,'32 being based on the realistic
premise that private enterprise, unaided, cannot produce new housing
for most of the state's inhabitants,'3 3 goes far beyond the federal mort-
gage insurance programs. The state has directly entered into the finance
field and qualified mortgagors may borrow from the state134 or munici-
pality 35 up to ninety per cent of the development cost of a project for
rough estimate of the costs of a recently completed project for the elderly in the Boston
area ran to $17,500 a unit. Figures received from Frank Morris, Director of the Massachu-
setts Housing Board. (e) In a letter from the Renewal and Development Corporation to
the author, H. R. Taylor, Executive Vice President, stated that in most areas the high
cost of money, labor, materials and land would mean that new construction could not
be brought within the means of families with incomes below $7,000.
131. Vernon, The Myth and Reality of our Urban Problem 11 (mimeographed text
of the 1961 Stafford Little Lectures at Princeton). Compare N.Y. Priv. Hous. Fin. Law
§ 2(19) which uses the same formula, i.e., "'Persons of low income' . . . who cannot afford
to pay enough to cause private enterprise ... to build a sufficient supply of adequate, safe
and sanitary dwellings," to set the basis for a massive program for subsidized middle-
income housing.
132. N.Y. Priv. Hous. Fin. Law §§ 10-37.
133. Ibid. See also Mitchell, Foreword to N.Y. Priv. Hous. Fin. Law at vii (McKinney
ed. 1962).
134. N.Y. Priv. Hous. Fin. Law § 22.
135. N.Y. Priv. Hous. Fin. Law § 23.
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up to fifty years with a rate of interest around three per cent."-" The
cities are also authorized to grant tax abatements of up to fifty per
cent, 137 and to help in site assembly through their eminent domain power.
The borrowers in turn are closely supervised by either state or local
agencies and are limited as to their profit. 38
For the condominium to fit into this program, loans to individuals as
well as corporations will have to be allowed. Although the construction
stages of the project will proceed in the same manner as at present, with
the sponsor forming a limited profit housing company, the second step
will involve individual mortgages rather than the one large corporate
mortgage. This increase of paper work will perhaps be balanced by the
decrease made possible by the elimination of incorporationY3 9 A direct
loan from either a state or municipal agency would also eliminate the
difficulty of conflicting valuations caused by a multitude of lending insti-
tutions being involved.
Paralleling the limitation on profits imposed on both the sponsor and
the housing company, the powers of the unit owner will have to be
limited to avoid a free ride at the expense of the state. If the owner were
allowed to sell at the market price he would merely be cashing in on the
subsidies previously made available. Any such sale would also have the
effect of limiting potential purchasers to upper-income groups. An option
would, therefore, be vested with the co-owners, exercisable at the book
value, with perhaps the resale price geared to a cost of living index set
by the supervising agency, with any increase in value flowing to either
the state or local government coffers. Thus the owner, although barred
from profiting, is insured against losing due to the large amount of sub-
sidy originally involved; the co-owners can still control the choice of
neighbors within the income limits set by the statute; and the govern-
mental agencies can achieve a modest profit.
The condominium, besides its aforementioned advantages, would also
offer a great deal of flexibility in dealing with the owner who has ex-
ceeded the income limits of the project. Whereas under the present
cooperative scheme the Draconic measure of eviction is resorted to, the
individual mortgage and tax assessment can encourage the values to be
136. N.Y. Priv. Hous. Fin. Law § 26(2).
137. N.Y. Priv. Hous. Fin. Law § 33(1).
133. For a good view of the operation of the law at the project level, see, e.g., Informa-
tion Bulletin of Lindsey Park Project (1961).
139. Governor Rockefeller has urged the N.Y. Legislature to allow the State Housing
Finance Agency to make direct low interest loans to purchascrs of cooperative units. N.Y.
Herald Tribune, Feb. 27, 1962, p. 21, col. S.
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gained by "a more stable project community with families having a
greater diversity of income and background,"'140 by raising tax asses-
ments and interest rates, thereby removing the unneeded subsidy and
not the occupant.
IV. CONCLUSION
It would thus seem that under the present federal program the condo-
minium is not going anywhere as far as the urban median-incomed
family is concerned. This failure, however, lies not in the unattractive-
ness of the condominium as a form of ownership, but in the inability of
the building industry to bring forth an adequate supply of housing (in
an era when development costs in urban areas are rising faster than
personal income) without an increase in the caloric content of the federal
or local government's carrot. If this latter condition were met, the
prediction of Lester Eisner that the condominium "will be the big thing
in housing in about ten years or so''4 may be inaccurate only in the
excessive length of time which he postulates will be needed.
140. Hon. McNeil Mitchell quoted in N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1962, p. 27, col. 8. It Is
submitted, however, that the State Senator is wrong in his view that federal mortgage
insurance would be available at the present time to an individual who wishes to purchase
an apartment in fee simple in an otherwise traditional cooperative. See 24 C.F.R. § 234.26
(1962).
141. N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1961, § 1, p. 66, col. 2. Ironically, Mr. Eisner is a Regional
Administrator of the federal program.
